You are right, they might be spot on about this, although the recall vote always raises question. Partisanship is a bit different, because you have independents you have to push. The recall vote, if accurate, raises some questions for me. I have 0 evidence for this but I would be astounded if the 2026 Ohio electorate voted for Trump by 9 pts.
It might also be very early to accurately guess how strong Democratic turnout will be.
While I agree that the order of states could be off, the NYT polls are still suggesting shifts of anywhere from 8-14% from 2024 (excluding Maine, given the extenuating circumstances). I'm skeptical Dems do much better than that, and their modeled electorate shift of D+4 would be historically consistent (https://plusminus4.substack.com/p/blue-wave-polls)
Texas is unique in that it swung unusually hard for Trump in 2024. If you want a better baseline for Texas's partisanship relative to the national environment, use the 2024 Senate race and the 2022 Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General races.
The actual national environment, as per polling, is currently D+6-8, which would mean an electorate shift of D+8-10. An electorate shift of D+4 as modeled here would mean a D+2 national environment, which would be very surprising unless one weighted to recalled vote or things change drastically in favor of Republicans between now and the election.
If I'm understanding you correctly, why assume the 8-10% shift is entirely driven by the electorate when this hasn't been true of past midterms (or of current polling)? Registered voter polls right now are still showing D+4 environments. 2010 was an R+15 swing from 2008—the likely voter effect was about R+7, and the rest was persuasion.
The deal is that it's next to impossible to have a functional likely voter screen. Weight 2024 too much, and you underestimate Democrats. Voter enthusiasm is hard to translate into whether someone will actually vote. Just asking people if they will vote or not seems to require a ginormous sample size considering that it's an extra variable usually not too dependent on partisanship. And if we just go off of registered voters this early in the game we miss first-time voters and voters who have to re-register because they got purged from the voting rolls, missing enthusiasm gaps.
Yes, some of the shift is driven by persuasion, but this article shows that the electorate is off as well.
You are right, they might be spot on about this, although the recall vote always raises question. Partisanship is a bit different, because you have independents you have to push. The recall vote, if accurate, raises some questions for me. I have 0 evidence for this but I would be astounded if the 2026 Ohio electorate voted for Trump by 9 pts.
It might also be very early to accurately guess how strong Democratic turnout will be.
While I agree that the order of states could be off, the NYT polls are still suggesting shifts of anywhere from 8-14% from 2024 (excluding Maine, given the extenuating circumstances). I'm skeptical Dems do much better than that, and their modeled electorate shift of D+4 would be historically consistent (https://plusminus4.substack.com/p/blue-wave-polls)
Texas is unique in that it swung unusually hard for Trump in 2024. If you want a better baseline for Texas's partisanship relative to the national environment, use the 2024 Senate race and the 2022 Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General races.
The actual national environment, as per polling, is currently D+6-8, which would mean an electorate shift of D+8-10. An electorate shift of D+4 as modeled here would mean a D+2 national environment, which would be very surprising unless one weighted to recalled vote or things change drastically in favor of Republicans between now and the election.
If I'm understanding you correctly, why assume the 8-10% shift is entirely driven by the electorate when this hasn't been true of past midterms (or of current polling)? Registered voter polls right now are still showing D+4 environments. 2010 was an R+15 swing from 2008—the likely voter effect was about R+7, and the rest was persuasion.
The deal is that it's next to impossible to have a functional likely voter screen. Weight 2024 too much, and you underestimate Democrats. Voter enthusiasm is hard to translate into whether someone will actually vote. Just asking people if they will vote or not seems to require a ginormous sample size considering that it's an extra variable usually not too dependent on partisanship. And if we just go off of registered voters this early in the game we miss first-time voters and voters who have to re-register because they got purged from the voting rolls, missing enthusiasm gaps.
Yes, some of the shift is driven by persuasion, but this article shows that the electorate is off as well.